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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Respondent,) 
vs. ] 
WAYNE S. WARDLE, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 890372-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's alternative fraud theory is completely 
unsupported by any competent or persuasive evidence and the 
Defendant was prejudiced by cross-examination and argument 
calculated to establish his guilt under such a theory. 
Furthermore, the Defendant was unfairly prejudiced in 
cross-examination by innuendo which was calculated to destroy his 
credibility. 
Finally, the inadequacy of the "reasonable doubt" 
instruction would have been substantially cured had the proposed 
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction been given and the 
Defendant has preserved his right to appellate review of this issue 
by exceptions taken in the trial court. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AS A RESULT OF 
UNWARRANTED AND PREJUDICIAL ATTACKS UPON HIS 
CHARACTER AND CREDIBILITY. 
The State contends: "Defendant's claims of unfair 
prejudice rest upon his misleading representation of the facts 
presented at trial and his mischaracterization of the cross-
examination about his finances as impeachment." Resp. Br. at 8. 
In addressing the issue involving the alternative fraud 
theory, the State argues that the record contains competent and 
persuasive evidence establishing that the Defendant's building "was 
not worth more than $13,000." Resp. Br. at 8. 
The testimony to which the State refers follows: 
A. [BY MR. JENSEN] 
• * * 
As far as the amount, the amount that was requested 
by an independent agent that had coverage through 
our company, he set the amount. I think it was 
probably an excessive guess, because I think we 
have a contractor that looked at it and said he 
could have probably rebuilt the building back to 
the condition it was in for less than half of what 
the insurance was on the building. 
Q. He could have rebuilt that particular building 
for how much? 
A. I think he mentioned right around $13,000. 
[Emphasis added] 
T. 148-149. 
As a general rule, if hearsay evidence is admitted 
without objection, it becomes competent evidence admissible for all 
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purposes. See generally, Annot. 79 A.L.R.2d 890, Section 3 (1961). 
However, this rule "does not operate to make objectionable 
testimony conclusive proof of the matter asserted therein. The 
fact that it was hearsay does not prevent its use as proof so far 
as it has probative value, but this is limited to the extent of 
whatever rational persuasive power it may have." State v. Romero, 
352 P.2d 781, 783 (N.M. 1960) (reversing a burglary conviction based 
substantially upon hearsay which was admitted without objection). 
In State v. McGann, 132 Ariz. 296, 645 P.2d 811 (1982), 
the defendant appealed his conviction on four counts of forgery. 
The only proof that certain signatures were unauthorized was 
provided through hearsay. In reversing the conviction, the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that where an essential element of the criminal 
offense was established solely by hearsay evidence, the admission 
of the hearsay was "fundamental error" requiring reversal, 
notwithstanding the fact that the hearsay had been admitted without 
objection. 
See also Glenn v. United States, (1959, CA6 Tenn.) 271 
F.2d 880. Cf. Kilaore v. State. 25 Okl. Cr. 69, 219 P. 160 (1923) 
(motion for directed verdict should have been granted where proof 
of an essential element of the offense was merely hearsay). 
Defendant concedes that trial counsel failed to interpose 
any objection to testimony regarding what some undisclosed 
"contractor" allegedly estimated as the "probable" cost of 
replacing the building. This equivocal hearsay is, as a matter of 
law, insufficient to support a prosecution on the alternative fraud 
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theory. 
The mischief created by the introduction of this hearsay 
was later compounded by the prosecutor's innuendo suggesting that 
the statement regarding the cost of reconstructing the building had 
been made by the Defendant himself: 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] Is it true it only cost $13,000 
to put a new building on the site where the old one 
burned down? 
A. [BY THE DEFENDANT] That isn't true. 
Q. Did you ever tell Mic Jensen that? 
A. What? 
Q. That it only cost $13,000 to put up a new 
building where the old one went down? 
A. I think you misunderstood the conversation. 
Q. I'm asking you, sir, did you ever tell him that? 
A. I don't believe so. 
T. 336. 
After combing through the Proof of Loss Statement, the 
State has come up with what it believes is further evidence of the 
inflation of the insurance claim. 
The Proof of Loss statement provided in the 
appendix of the defendant's brief lists an estimate 
of $544 for sheetrock for the office wall, yet, 
prior to the firef there was no sheetrock on the 
walls in the area of the office that burned (T.37, 
87-88, 104). There was only thin wood paneling 
with no sheetrock underneath (T.37). 
Resp. Br. at 9. 
This is a theory that was never approached by the 
prosecutor at trial. The State would have this Court speculate 
concerning the relative cost of restoring the office area with 
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sheetrock walls and the cost of restoring the walls with wood 
paneling and from that conjecture find a sufficient basis for 
arguing the Defendant's gui l t on the al ternat ive fraud theory. 
The State concludes that the foregoing "evidence" 
demonstrates the prosecutor's good faith in cross-examination and 
argument which suggested that i t was a "cop-out" for the Defendant 
to hire a public adjuster to evaluate his loss and criminal for him 
to submit a Proof of Loss Statement without personally verifying 
each item.1 
In c l o s i n g , the prosecutor argued: 
He claims no knowledge about the proof of l o s s , which i s 
troubl ing a l s o . Here's a man who submits a claim t o the 
insurance company for $24,900.00, s igns i t on the bottom 
saying i t ' s t rue , correct and accurate, and yet on the stand 
yesterday he sa id: I don't r e a l l y know too much about i t , I 
hired a couple of public adjustors t o take care of the 
s i t u a t i o n . 
Well, that in r e a l i t y i s a cop-out by the Defendant t o say I 
don't know what the po l i cy i s a l l about, I don't know what the 
proof of l o s s i s a l l about, and yet I'm going t o rece ive that 
money from the insurance company. 
T. 371. 
The State takes a similar position in its brief on appeal. Resp. Br. 
at 10. 
In fact, under cross-examination, the Defendant testified: 
Q. [BY MR. JONES] And it's your testimony to the jury that you 
didn't know anything at all about what went into the Proof of 
Loss? 
A. [BY THE DEFENDANT] No, I read it. I understand the Proof 
and Loss exactly. 
Q. Not only did you read it, Mr. Wardie, you signed it? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Acknowledging the contents of that Proof of Loss is true 
and correct? 
A. I believe that it is true and correct. 
T. 333. 
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The State attempts to justify the destructive cross-
examination on the subject of the Defendant's "financial interest." 
A relevant inquiry would have directly approached the Defendant's 
financial condition at the time of the fire. Instead, the 
prosecutor chose to paint the Defendant as dishonest in his 
business dealings and in his denial of the prosecutor's specific 
questions for which the jury would surely assume there existed a 
good-faith basis.2 
The State suggests that the impeaching character of the 
inquiry should be disregarded and the prosecutor should not be 
required to establish good faith in making the inquiry because the 
evidence was introduced for the purpose of establishing the 
Defendant's "financial interest" and "was not sought for 
impeachment of defendant's credibility." Resp. Br. at 13. 
The State then suggests that the authorities cited by the 
Defendant should be distinguished because the impeachment in the 
instant case does not arise out of questioning involving prior 
felony convictions. Resp. Br. at 14-15. 
Finally, the State attempts to downplay the impact of 
this line of questioning and the prosecutor's failure to offer 
rebuttal by pointing out that, in his closing argument, the 
prosecutor conceded that he had failed to establish any evidence of 
financial motive. Resp. Br. at 13. 
2,,The prosecuting attorney may well be assumed to be a man of fair standing 
before the jury; and they may well have thought that he would not have asked the 
question unless he could have proved what it intimated if he had been allowed to 
do so." People v. Wells, 100 Cal. 459, 462, 34 Pac. 1078, 1079 (1893). 
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State v. Singleton, 66 Ariz. 49, 182 P.2d 920 (1947), was 
an appeal from a murder conviction. The "very heart" of the 
defendant's theory of self-defense lie in establishing his 
reputation for being a peaceable man. On cross-examination, the 
prosecutor asked the defendant three times whether or not he had 
threatened a third party by the name of Menacey. Three times the 
defendant denied it. The State contended that "this line of 
questioning was not put to lay the foundation for impeachment, but 
was designed to rebut defendant's claim of self defense and on that 
basis was both admissible and proper." 182 P.2d at 929. In 
reversing the conviction, the Arizona Supreme Court stated; 
[W]hen, as here, such questioning is raised and 
then dropped with no further attempt on the part of 
the State to prove its point, the aforementioned 
"fishing expedition" having failed, we believe it 
to be wholly improper and highly prejudicial. To 
allow this sort of examination would be to allow 
the imaginative and overzealous prosecutor to 
concoct a damaging line of examination which could 
leave with the jury the impression that defendant 
was anything that the questions, by innuendo, 
seemed to suggest. If the questions were 
persistent enough and cleverly enough framed, no 
amount of denial on the part of a defendant would 
be able to erase the impression in the mind of the 
jury that the prosecutor actually had such facts at 
hand and that probably there was some truth to the 
insinuations. 
182 P.2d at 930. 
The condemnation of innuendo has never been limited to 
situations where the tactic is used to imply the existence of a 
prior criminal record. See ABA, Code of Professional 
Responsibility DR 7-106(C)(1); ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice 
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3-5.7(d);3 6 Wiamore, Evidence, Section 1808(2)(Chadbourn rev. 
1976). 
No trial lawyer could read pages 342 through 355 of the 
transcript and conclude that the mischief introduced thereby was 
remedied by the prosecutor's concession that he had failed to 
establish a financial motive for the fire. 
It has been said that cross-examination is the most 
effective machine devised for getting at the truth. Cross-
examination by innuendo is the most effective machine devised for 
creating the illusion of truth and the illusion of effective 
impeachment. The power of innuendo lies in deception. It breeds 
suspicion and spawns skepticism. It cuts to the very core of a 
defense based primarily upon the accused's credibility. It is a 
dangerous tactic which has no place in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. 
This was trial by innuendo, guilt by impeachment. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPELLATE 
REVIEW OF THE JURY INSTRUCTION ISSUES. 
The S t a t e acknowledges t h a t t h e Defendant proposed a 
"reasonable a l t e r n a t i v e h y p o t h e s i s " i n s t r u c t i o n which t h e d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t r e f u s e d t o g i v e . The S t a t e f u r t h e r acknowledges t h a t t h e 
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"It i s an improper t a c t i c for the prosecutor t o attempt t o communicate 
impressions by innuendo through quest ions that would be t o the defendant's 
advantage t o answer in the negat ive , for example, 'Have you ever been convicted 
of the crime of robbery?' or 'Weren't you a member of the Communist party?' or 
'Did you t e l l Mr. X that . . . ? ' when the quest ioner has no evidence t o support the 
innuendo." Comment, ABA, Standards of Criminal J u s t i c e 3 - 5 . 7 . 
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Defendant took exception to the district court's refusal to give 
the proposed instruction. However, the State argues that the 
Defendant has waived his right to a review of the adequacy of the 
instructions given because trial counsel did not take exception to 
the "reasonable doubt" instruction. What the State fails to 
recognize is that the inadequacy of the "reasonable doubt" 
instruction would have been substantially cured had the proposed 
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction been given. 
The precise deficiency of which Defendant complains was 
recognized by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v. 
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1382 (Utah 1989): 
Finally, I submit that it is inappropriate to 
instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a 
possibility, as the instruction in this case does. 
Possibilities may or may not create doubt. 
Depending on the circumstances, a possibility may 
constitute a reasonable doubt. Whether a 
possibility is sufficient to create a reasonable 
doubt depends upon the likelihood of the 
possibility. Certainly a fanciful or wholly 
speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. But the instruction does 
not make the point clear. 
An instruction that a reasonable doubt must be a 
"real, substantial doubt, and not one that is 
merely possible or imaginary" has been held to be 
erroneous because, in practical effect, it tends to 
diminish the prosecutor's burden of proof by 
implying that the prosecution need not obviate a 
real or substantial doubt. [Citation omitted] 
In my view, the trial court's instruction was 
clearly erroneous and ought to be so declared. 
In Ireland the majority affirmed the defendant's 
conviction but noted: 
We do acknowledge however, that the dissent's 
criticisms of the "more weighty affairs of life" 
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language is justified and share Justice Stewart's 
concern that the "possible or imaginary" language 
might, by implication, be understood to diminish 
the prosecutor's standard of proof. Therefore, in 
our supervisory capacity, we direct the trial 
courts to discontinue use of that language in their 
instructions on the definition of reasonable doubt. 
773 P.2d at 1380. 
The problems discussed in Ireland are presented 
foursquare by the exception that was taken in the trial court. In 
the instant case, the Defendant does not claim personal knowledge 
of all of the circumstances which led to the fire. He was left to 
answer the charges by declaring his innocence and proposing 
possible explanations which incorporated the circumstances as he 
understood them to be. Clearly the refusal to give the "reasonable 
alternative hypothesis" instruction was error where the "reasonable 
doubt" instruction suggested the inadequacy of a defense based upon 
"possible" explanations for the origin of the fire. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the State's alternative 
fraud theory is completely unsupported by any competent or 
persuasive evidence. The Defendant was prejudiced by cross-
examination and argument calculated to establish his guilt under 
such a theory. 
Furthermore, the Defendant was unfairly prejudiced in 
cross-examination by innuendo which was calculated to destroy his 
credibility. 
Finallyf the inadequacy of the "reasonable doubt" 
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instruction would have been substantially cured had the proposed 
•".rertFi >ntibJ *•* -jlt-pinH M,M • hypothesis" instruction been given and * • *-
Defendant has preserved his right to appellate review -: 
by exceptions taken in i;he ii'idi cumin . 
I I i s r e s f i e c t I in 1 I «; .11 , Defendant's 
convictions should be reversed and • :ase remanded for a new 
trial. 
DATVD lliih AiltA c February, 1990. 
N 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
MAJ LI NCJ I'KHTIFICATE 
1 do hereby certify that on this /7fM fA day of February, 
1990, I did personally mail four true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing document to R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, 
and Sandra L, Sjogren, Assistant Attorney Genera] , at 236 State 
Capital salt *Ve ritv. Utah 84114. 
/ * / 
Gary W. Pendleton 
11 
